What About Relativism III?

The last two posts focused, respectively, on why relativism exists and is a necessary part of life, and what a few of its challenges are. I want to briefly address what may be one of the most sensitive issues among relativists and non-relativists alike---cultural relativism.

Cultural relativism argues that one culture’s morals or norms cannot be judged from the standpoint of another’s. Relativism sees all cultures’ views as having the same value, and one cannot be better than another. Sensitivity to cultural differences is a legitimate concern because judging another culture as deficient may mean denigrating both the culture and its people, and perhaps even taking action against that culture.

Understanding cultural relativism means establishing a context. We know that nothing exists in a vacuum, that everything and every view has a context which helps explain it more fully. The smallest context in human societies is the individual, a culture of one. The following shows increasingly broad contexts (cultures) as we go down the list. The list is oversimplified at the individual level, for just one, since any person actually belongs to many sub-sub-sub cultures simultaneously.

·       Individual

·       Family

·       Neighborhood

·       City/County

·       State

·       Nation

·       World (nations, tribes/clans)

Many relativists say that all critiques within and among the first 6 categories are acceptable, since they are all part of one “culture,” but no individuals or groups within the 6 can critique cultures or societies in the last one. Thus, the members of any culture (really nation for the most part) can critique internally but may not do so externally. The relativists have drawn a line, but in my view there is no logical basis for that line. Internal versus external is as much a matter of geography as anything else. For example, while cultural differences do exist among many developed, Western societies, we might argue that the Western world is becoming more like one big culture, even while national boundaries persist. What is internal then?

However, line or not, even the strongest relativists I know will not hesitate to criticize another nation in a moment, say Israel for not being sensitive enough to the plight of the Palestinians---fair enough. At the same time they will also criticize Boko Haram, an entity not exactly tribal, but in the ball park, for its vicious and barbaric behavior---also fair enough. So, then, what meaning does the view that we cannot judge other cultures have?

To demonstrate what looks to me like a bizarre and confused state of affairs for relativists, let’s ask a few simple additional questions. We assume a New Guinea native is allowed under relativism to critique his tribe, and also to critique his national government. But can a New Guinea native criticize a Rwandan Hutu practice he does not like? May a resident of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (once Belgian Congo) criticize Belgium for its awful treatment of the Congolese while it was a colonial power in the late 19^th century? Further, may a Chiapas (Mexico) peasant criticize honor killings of women who have been raped in Afghanistan? May a Saudi Mullah condemn those? May I?

The “clear” line of relativity is fuzzy if not opaque.

Some relativists think that if a culture believes that what it is doing is right, then it is right for them, even if it looks very wrong to us. Do the motives and justifications that a person has (Hitler for one, who seemed to believe he was doing the right thing for Germany) mean we cannot criticize his actions, or even take action against him? Or, is it the effect on others that matters most? Hitler and his cronies were judged at Nuremberg from the latter view, but relativism may see things from the former view. And likely the leaders of Boko Haram think they are doing good for themselves and their world view. So what meaning does what a person or group thinks have? None by my view.

Among the strong relativists is a small group saying that you cannot judge anyone for anything, what we might call arch-relativism. Naturally, acting this out leads directly and inevitably to anarchy. But, like some other relativists, these extremists are so in name only. They make pronouncements about not judging, but have their own sets of rules regarding who gets judged and who does not, and these will cross all sorts of “lines.”

Lastly, muddying the waters considerably is the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is fully supported by all the relativists I know. The important phrase in the Preamble says that these rights are “…rights of all members of the human family….” This clearly implies a set of judgments about what are human rights, and that those human rights are universal, applying to all nations and tribes/clans. That position further implies a judgment of which states (or other entities) are not abiding by those rights, thus subject to cross-cultural criticism, and perhaps even action. How can a relativist support this view of the human family when he also views the values and behavior of other cultures to be inviolate? Troubling, indeed.

What About Relativism II

In the last post I raised the issue of relativism, defining it and emphasizing that relativism exists as a function of being human and is thus an important aspect in our lives. I want to make clear that the comments below do not mean or imply I am opposed to relativism, because there are many aspects I agree with and follow, as noted in the last post. Now, however, I want to examine some of the challenges of relativism. I will touch lightly on only a few of relativism’s challenges. But for those wishing a real shock about relativism’s troubles, I recommend The Book of Absolutes: A Critique of Relativism and a Defense of Universals, by William D. Gairdner.

I want to emphasize that there are what I call strong and weak relativists. The former accept, from the last post, my definition and its action implications completely (even if they do not practice it fully). But the latter may have reservations about such totality of acceptance. I am a weak relativist.

At the macro level relativism has a significant philosophical problem: The idea that there are no absolute truths, norms or values suffers from an unfortunate internal contradiction---the assertion itself is an absolute truth, creating a rather awkward logical situation. Academic though this may appear, this challenge is quite important because it can cause considerable trouble, as will see shortly.

The heart of relativism is that judgment is a bad thing. We cannot judge others from our standpoint, and in many ways this is quite reasonable. You lack an appreciation of a film that I like. I prefer large cars to small ones and my wife prefers the opposite. You have occasional experiences of transcendence and I do not. These statements express a preference, and they are ripe for judging. I say that my view of the film is better than yours, or that your transcendence is nothing but an illusion.

Relativists accept that we all hold different views about nearly everything, but they object to saying that one side has a “better” view or one side has a lock on the truth. But weak relativists understand that judging something as better or more proper than another has a place, in the sense, for example, of a teacher correcting a student’s paper. The trouble for other relativists is that even in this proper setting for judgment, standards are implied or stated. Standards upset many relativists because they imply a hierarchy of correctness or truth that they think may lead to criticism or demeaning of some views deemed inappropriate or incorrect. While they may be correct at times in the assumption of criticism, it is clear that standards are needed in many aspects of our lives.

Stemming from the philosophical problem I mentioned is another, one in which relativism is applied selectively, and by my view inappropriately, to meet personal preferences. For example, some relativists will not hesitate to condemn in very strong ad hominem terms someone, say a religious person, who has a more absolutist view of the world than they do. Relativists, like many of us, take their opinions, values, norms, goals, and actions seriously---so seriously that it amounts to a form of absolutism and judgment, the very things they say they wish to avoid. Thus, the above-noted internal contradiction plays itself out in ways detrimental to the relativist’s own position and to others who are on the receiving end. People and groups they like are not to be judged, but ones they do not like are fair game. This speaks of hypocrisy.

Yet a third challenge, of strong relativism at least, is that it compels the practitioner to avoid criticizing anything. If no values or standards are better than any others, including those held by the relativist himself, how can he in any logical sense critique anything? He cannot, but we know that many relativists are undeterred by their lack of consistency and will criticize whatever and whomever they want in the most absolute terms, all the while telling others that they cannot do what the relativist does. The further implication of the view that “no one system or value set is better than another” is that it has to preclude progress, which is often based on extensive criticism and turning old systems and ideas upside down. Obviously relativists do not avoid such critiques, and are thus stuck once again with challenging inconsistency.

Beyond this very important issue of judging is another one related to standards and the hierarchies they express. As implied above, in the view of many strong relativists one person’s view on something is as good as another’s. Hierarchies of authority or knowledge are considered inappropriate. For example, if I, totally untutored in music, make a pronouncement on the quality of a particular composition, it is the equal of an observation by a professor of music, or by a noted critic. My pronouncement is considered valid simply because I hold it. Thus we have people of all walks of life making statements about things of which they have little or no knowledge, yet are convinced that their view is “correct.” Those who hold a different view, perhaps experts in the field, have no better claim to correctness than I do.

Regrettably for the relativists, this belief is false on the face of it. It can be demonstrated with a bit of delightful absurdity when it comes to qualifications involving something significant that is at stake for the relativist. Imagine that you, a relativist, need a spine operation. I tell you that my method is as good as the Harvard doctor you are consulting who has 30 years of experience.

Think only for a second about letting me near your spine with a knife.

Relativists may be intentionally confusing one’s right (or I prefer opportunity) to state an opinion with whether that opinion has any value or correctness. As is clear to anyone who wants a spine operation or, more mundanely, to have her car repaired, hierarchies of knowledge, experience, and utility definitely exist. There are some views, values, and norms that are more simply effective or more correct than others. There is no avoiding it.

Next post the bugaboo of bugaboos: Cultural relativism.